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If you happened to be driving down the road in Sweden at 04:501
on 3 September 1967, the Swedish government required you to2
stop. You then had to move slowly from the left to the right side of3
the road, and at 05:00 you could continue on your way. Although4
Sweden invested heavily in preparing for this pivotal ten minutes,5
the transition from left to right created some inevitable confusion (1).6
Nonetheless, the transition to a new equilibrium was fast. Traffic7
accidents and insurance claims actually declined immediately after8
the change, presumably because of extra caution behind the wheel,9
but they soon returned to normal (2). With a one-time government10
initiative, Swedes tipped from driving on the left to driving on the11
right, where they have remained ever since. The rest of us gained12
a compelling metaphor, arguably too compelling, for how social13
tipping can support society-wide changes in culture consistent with14
policy goals.15
I say “arguably too compelling” because choosing a side of the16
road is a special kind of coordination problem maximally suited17
to rapid change. The question is, when does the potential for18
rapid social tipping extend to other coordination problems that are19
similar in some ways but different in others? More broadly, can20
we predict and even control tipping in settings that are typical pre-21
cisely because they are more complex than choosing the left or22
right side of the road? In a companion article, Andreoni et al. (3)23
examine exactly these questions with a theoretical and experimen-24
tal approach. Apart from basic scientific interest, the questions25
are relevant across an impressive array of policy domains where26
social norms, applied cultural evolution, and tipping appear as27
related mechanisms for behavior change (4, 5). Example domains28
range from equality, social justice, and health (6, 7) to resource29
conservation (8, 9) and climate change (10, 11).30
Choosing a side of the road is a special problem for at least31
three reasons. Simple preferences to coordinate with people32
nearby do not mix with other motives. Moreover, these prefer-33
ences are the same for everyone, and they are stable through34
time. Intuitively, from an ex ante perspective before a society has35
chosen left or right, everyone agrees that either side is and will36
remain just as good as the other. The one and only concern is that37
everyone makes the same choice. Language is similar. “Der Hund”38
and ”le chien” both work fine and will continue to do so; we just39
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need to agree (12, 13). Step outside these two domains, however, 40
and many coordination problems involve a number of additional 41
complexities. 42
Andreoni et al. (3) add important and realistic complexity by 43
abandoning exactly the three characteristics that make driving 44
and language special problems. They examine a setting in which 45
individuals are randomly paired to play a game. Each player must 46
choose blue or green, and everyone faces incentives to coordinate 47
their choices with their partners. Players play, receive a payoff, 48
update their beliefs about how others play, and then pair off and 49
play again. So far, this sounds like driving, but the similarities end 50
there. Specifically, each player has a ranking over the equilibria of 51
the game, which means the player either prefers coordinating on 52
blue over coordinating on green or vice versa. Players also differ 53
from each other in terms of their rankings, and player rankings 54
change through time. 55
Andreoni et al. (3) emphasize the evolution of social norms as 56
an organizing principle. A norm is a common behavior together 57
with the widespread belief that the behavior is and should remain 58
common. A norm helps people pick a specific behavior when 59
everyone values choosing the same behavior, which is a problem 60
with multiple solutions. This pressure to behave like others is 61
also why norm evolution can exhibit tipping. If a status quo norm 62
becomes unstable, the pressure to conform can lead the population 63
to coalesce quickly around a new norm. 64
To develop a modeling framework for how norms evolve, An- 65
dreoni et al. (3) decompose preferences into three parts. First, 66
each player faces a basic material incentive that favors either coor- 67
dinating on blue over coordinating on green or vice versa. Second, 68
each player faces material incentives that are relevant when two 69
players choose different options. Specifically, in addition to the 70
opportunity costs of miscoordination, each player in a miscoordinat- 71
ing pair pays a cost that increases as the player’s choice becomes 72
more unusual. We can interpret this cost as punishment. These 73
first two components of the incentive structure are material in the 74
sense that they were monetized in Andreoni et al.’s experiment. 75
More broadly, they represent the public features of decision mak- 76
ing that would be readily available for policy intervention. A policy 77
maker, for example, can subsidize the behavior she prefers, tax 78




the behaviors she does not prefer, and punish deviants. The third79
component of preferences is an idiosyncratic psychological quan-80
tity that appears in the predictive model of Andreoni et al. but was81
not monetized in their experiment. Among other interpretations,82
variation in this quantity represents the fact that some people are83
more open to new experiences than others, a form of ordinary het-84
erogeneity that can affect the spread of innovations in a population85
(14, 15).86
With all three parts of the theoretical incentive structure in place,87
each individual has an indifference point. If the proportion of individ-88
uals recently choosing green is at least as large as this indifference89
point, the individual in question chooses green by assumption. The90
population consists of a distribution of indifference points. This dis-91
tribution changes through time and in turn influences how behavior92
and associated norms evolve.93
In Andreoni et al.’s (3) experimental sessions, material incen-94
tives initially favored coordinating on blue over coordinating on95
green, and groups immediately adopted a blue norm as a result.96
With a blue norm in place, material incentives began to change. At97
a given point in time, for any individual whose material incentives98
favored blue over green, these incentives would switch the ranking99
with probability 0.1. As these new incentives trickled into the popu-100
lation, the distribution of indifference points should have become101
increasingly favorable for green.102
Fig. 1 shows a stylized simulation in which this steady trickle103
leads to tipping. In t = 1, no one faces material incentives that fa-104
vor coordinating on green. All three parts of the incentive structure105
combine to create a distribution of indifference points that is not106
favorable for green, and no one chooses green. Material incentives107
then begin to change, and the distribution of indifference points108
drifts downward. For a while, behavior change lags behind as ev-109
eryone continues to conform to the status quo blue norm. At t = 6,110
changes in behavior start to race ahead of the changes in material111
incentives, and by t = 9 the entire population has switched to112
choosing green. This is social tipping. Coordination and conformity113
oppose the behavioral effects of changing incentives at first, but114
then suddenly a new regime appears in which they amplify these115
effects.116
This kind of tipping, however, may not occur, and altogether117
Andreoni et al. (3) implemented nine experimental treatments to118
examine a variety of behavioral mechanisms. Four treatments op-119
erated directly via material incentives. Andreoni et al. manipulated120
the material incentives related to coordinating, and they manip-121
ulated the material punishment associated with miscoordinating.122
Their model does an outstanding job of predicting observed tipping123
(3, Fig. 4). In one especially revealing treatment, Andreoni et al.124
allowed the participants themselves to set the punishment costs125
of miscoordinating. This is like a situation in which a policy maker126
uses a combination of taxes and subsidies to promote a specific127
behavior, but the punishment of norm violations is an informal affair128
that citizens handle themselves. In this treatment, participants129
consistently set punishment costs too high. Doing so saved them130
the short-run costs of miscoordinating while transitioning to a new131
norm, but using punishment to block transitions brought substantial132
opportunity costs in the long-run.133
Four additional treatments manipulated the information and ex-134
pectations participants had about the changes occurring in their135
groups. In one treatment, participants received immediate feed-136
back about what others were choosing, an approach designed to137
mimic the speed of modern communications. One can imagine138
that readily available information would have facilitated tipping, but139
it did not. Instead, it seems to have made the early prevalence 140
of blue salient, and this treatment had no effect on tipping. In 141
another treatment, Andreoni et al. (3) cut the size of experimental 142
groups from 20 to 10, which increased the relative influence of 143
each decision maker. This significantly increased tipping. Surpris- 144
ingly, however, when transitions to a green norm occurred, they 145
were long drawn-out affairs with a lot of miscoordination along the 146
way. Average earnings were especially low as a result. This result 147
shows that transitions to a new, socially beneficial equilibrium can 148
actually be socially harmful depending on how long the transition 149
takes. 150
In the “Public awareness” and “Preference poll” treatments, An- 151
dreoni et al. (3) introduced two mechanisms designed to make 152
private information public (6). Under public awareness, the experi- 153
menters gave participants a running log of the kinds of changes in 154
material incentives taking place within the group. The preference 155
poll polled group members about their preferred norm after several 156
periods of play and immediately made the poll results public. Both 157
of these treatments revealed information about participants that 158
would have otherwise remained private, and even trivial revelations 159
of this sort can strongly affect cultural evolution (16). The result in 160
both treatments was a significant increase in tipping to the socially 161
beneficial norm. 162
Finally, Andreoni et al. implemented a treatment that rewarded 163
those who first attempted to instigate norm change, but only when 164
these attempts were successful. This extra reward for agents 165
of change seems to have motivated individuals predisposed to 166
change anyway, but it also ignored people with a status quo bias. 167
As the authors point out, tipping requires behavior change among 168
both types, both those who are ready to lead the way to a new 169
norm and those who are not. The results across groups in this 170
treatment were highly unpredictable, with half of the groups tip- 171
ping to green and half sticking with blue. Altogether, Andreoni et 172
al. used a convincing policy-inspired mix of treatments to detail 173
several behavioral subtleties related to tipping. At the same time, 174
their study highlights how much we still need to learn about the 175
various scenarios in which a policy maker might want to activate 176
endogenous cultural change. 177
One important scenario is when the population is sub-divided 178
into groups that have distinct social identities tied to the norms 179
and behaviors in question. For example, imagine a situation in 180
which some people have tied their social identities to their shared 181
decision to wear face masks in a pandemic, while others have 182
based their social identities on rejecting masks (17). In cases like 183
this, the distribution of indifference points will look quite different 184
from those assumed in Andreoni et al. (see also Fig. 1). The 185
distribution will tend to be strongly bimodal, with one mode for the 186
group that likes one behavior and another mode for the group that 187
likes the other behavior. Tipping points may not exist in situations 188
like this, and the most challenging situation of all is when the groups 189
have social identities that are not only distinct, but oppositional 190
(18). Oppositional identities would mean, for example, that the 191
group rejecting masks values this stance precisely because of 192
the difference it creates with respect to the group wearing masks 193
(19). If preferences take this form, the policy maker who sparks a 194
commitment to her preferred norm in one group likely entrenches 195
and adds value to a different norm in the other group (18). The 196
increasingly sectarian nature of U.S. politics (20) suggests that 197
dynamics of this sort could be common in the future. 198
A second issue involves the options available to the policy 199
maker. Andreoni et al. implement several treatments that reflect the 200




kinds of choices a policy maker might consider to try and provoke201
tipping. Their treatments represent policy initiatives that subsidize202
the desired behavior, punish the undesired behavior, influence the203
information people have, and reward those who instigate change.204
These are all important possibilities. In addition, a policy maker205
might also want to constrain an intervention to a specific segment of206
the population. Indeed, much of the policy appeal of tipping follows207
from the idea that an intervention touches only some people. When208
these people change their behavior, however, the effect spills over209
to generate additional change among those never exposed to the210
intervention. If a policy maker wants a constrained approach of this211
sort, she must decide whom to target. Some strategies prioritize212
the effects among those directly exposed to the intervention while213
minimizing the changes that occur among those not exposed.214
Other strategies do the opposite, with a range of trade-offs in215
between the extremes (18).216
Tipping has a theatrical quality, with rapid changes that some-217
how seem both surprising and obvious after they have occurred.218
Tipping is also tempting as a policy tool because it implies the219
policy maker can recruit social interactions within a population to220
point cultural evolution in a specific direction. Empirically, however,221
people are strikingly heterogeneous in terms of how they learn222
from and react to the choices of others (21, 22). This suggests that223
tipping and other cultural evolutionary processes can easily involve224
a daunting level of complexity. Andreoni et al. (3) have provided225
an important study of ways to examine and manage some of this226
complexity.227
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Fig. 1. An example of tipping based on the framework used in Andreoni
et al. (3). In t = 1, everyone faces material incentives that favor coordi-
nating on blue over coordinating on green (Column 1). The distribution of
indifference points is relatively unfavorable for green as a result (Column
2), and everyone chooses blue (Column 3). As time passes, individuals
experience changing material incentives. The distribution of thresholds
drifts steadily downward, in favor of green, but for a while (e.g. t ≤ 5)
this generates little change in behavior. At some point (e.g. t ≥ 6),
behavior change suddenly accelerates, and the population transitions
rapidly to a new norm. Broadly speaking, Andreoni et al. (3) examine
when the rapid change in behavior does or does not follow the change in
incentives.
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